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JURISDICTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
William Baude ∗
Courts don’t always do what the President wants, and sometimes the
President wants to fight back. As Gerard Magliocca’s interesting article
points out, Presidents have a range of options for political resistance. 1
But what about their options for legal resistance? It turns out that the
Constitution provides a narrow outlet for lawfully resisting the courts,
and that Roosevelt’s contingency plan for the Gold Clause Cases might
even have fit within it.
The Constitution vests the federal courts with “[t]he judicial
Power.” 2 That means that courts have the power to conclusively decide
cases on important constitutional issues. But this power has inherent
limits. A court’s judgment is conclusive only when the court has
jurisdiction over the case—a technical issue that is usually separate
from the merits. And because of that, a court’s judgment is also
conclusive only with respect to the immediate controversy before it. The
judgment may have practical consequences for many other people
whose claims will raise the same issues, but as a legal matter, those
claims aren’t yet resolved. 3
Thus, when judicial decisions threatened to frustrate President
Jefferson’s implementation of the Embargo of 1807, he devised a
jurisdictional theory to avoid compliance. At the same time, he worried
about subsequent suits for damages against his officers, where
jurisdiction could not be contested under the laws in force at the time. 4
So too, when Lincoln advocated resisting the Supreme Court’s decision
in Dred Scott, he adhered to the judgment principle. While conceding
that the decision bound the parties who had been before the court, he
argued that it should not be followed for other people not under the
Court’s jurisdiction. 5 And when Lincoln ignored the writ of habeas
corpus in Ex Parte Merryman, most of his administration’s arguments
(the “all the laws but one” flourish aside) were jurisdictional ones. 6
What is noteworthy, and what Magliocca touches on only briefly, is
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that even Roosevelt’s proposed resistance of the Gold Clause decision
appears roughly consistent with the Court’s judgment power. Suppose
that Perry—which was the closest case for the Government 7—had gone
the other way. The immediate decision would have affected only the
$10,000 before the court. President Roosevelt might or might not have
paid that judgment (and the court might have given him some time to do
it) but judgment would not have automatically resolved the claims of
other bondholders, who would have to bring subsequent suits. As to
those, the government planned to invoke sovereign immunity. 8
Sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional defense, depriving the court of
any power to lawfully issue judgments against the government. 9 This is
precisely the sort of resistance that the Constitution countenances. So
Roosevelt’s invocation of constitutional necessity actually fit within the
Constitution’s own rules for judicial power. Perhaps it is not a
coincidence that Roosevelt’s undelivered Gold Clause speech quoted
Lincoln’s discussion of Dred Scott. 10
To be sure, Roosevelt’s planned response in Perry may not have
turned perfectly square corners: Until sovereign immunity was formally
invoked, the President apparently planned to impose a 90-day
moratorium on the payment of the bonds, with no obvious jurisdictional
basis. 11 At the same time, it is unclear how rapidly federal courts would
have ordered payment in any of the new bond cases, so the moratorium
may not have created any judicial conflict. And it is not clear Roosevelt
had a plan for lawful defiance in the other cases besides Perry (the other
cases dealt with private agreements) but if he did, he would have had to
be more aggressive, such as by convincing Congress to pack the Court
or perhaps to strip it of appellate jurisdiction over subsequent suits.12 In
any case, the fundamental point is that the core of Roosevelt’s planned
response to the most important adverse ruling his administration might
face was a perfectly lawful one.
If I am right that even Roosevelt planned to channel his
disagreement with the Court into the technical legalisms of the
Constitution, the remaining question is why. Justice Breyer has noted
that this question is well-presaged by Shakespeare’s Henry IV, where
“Hotspur listens to Owen Glendower boast, ‘I can call spirits from the
vasty deep.’ Hotspur then replies, ‘Why, so can I, or so can any man,
7. See Magliocca, supra note 1, at 1268–69.
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but will they come when you do call for them?’” 13 The Constitution
may tell judges when they can issue binding judgments, but it gives
them few tools to actually force compliance, so the puzzle is why
Presidents would limit their resistance to that allowed by law.
One possibility is that there is something functional and intuitive
about using jurisdiction to resolve interbranch disputes. First-order
disagreements on questions of law might be intractable, tending to
destabilize the system and make legal resolution impossible. Perhaps
second-order questions of jurisdiction are more tractable; even if the
constitutional merits of a dispute are unclear, it might be clear whether a
court has the power to decide the dispute. Or even if the second-order
questions are no clearer, fragmenting the dispute into smaller pieces
gives both branches a chance to measure the strength of the other’s
resolve.
Another possibility is that at bottom the public really does care about
compliance with the law. A President who intends to defy another
branch of the federal government raises questions of political
legitimacy. By showing that his actions are in keeping with a formal
legal tradition that long predates the disputes of the day, the President
can resist the impression of an illegitimate power grab. One could even
imagine—or perhaps just hope 14—that a desire to obey the law comes
from within. Either way, as Magliocca concludes, “Mistakes come only
when those making a necessity claim abandon that kind of careful
examination.” 15
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